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INTRODUCTION

The National Football League (the "NFL" or the "League"), like the
National Basketball Association (the "NBA") and Major League Baseball
("MLB"), has a long history of racial exclusion.' And like these other long-

* Associate Professor of Law, The James E. Beasley School of Law, Temple University. J.D., Harvard
Law School; M.P.P., Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government; B.A., Brown
University.

I would like to thank Richard Diaz and Michael LaMare for extraordinary research

assistance. I dedicate this article to Cyrus Mehri, John Wooten, Kellen Winslow, Sr., and the late
Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr., for their courage in challenging the National Football League and ultimately,
perhaps, changing the face of American sport.
' See Kenneth L. Shropshire, In Black and White: Race and Sports in America 29-31 (1996)
(discussing history of discrimination in all three sports). The NHL, America's fourth premier sports
league, has had a discriminatory history as well, but in that athletes of color have historically played
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standing American professional sports leagues, desegregation among players
preceded desegregation among coaches. 2 As slowly increasing numbers of
minorities assumed NBA head coaching positions and MLB managing positions
toward the end of the twentieth century, however, minority NFL coaches were
less likely to receive head coaching opportunities than their basketball and
baseball counterparts. 3 Indeed, as of 2002, only two of the NFL's thirty-two
head coaches were minorities, and only five, including those two, had held head
Four years later,
coaching positions during the League's modem era. 4
however, the NFL had more than tripled its number of minority head coaches
and shone as a model for other athletic institutions seeking to provide head
coaching candidates equal employment opportunities.5
This article seeks to explore the history of racial exclusion in the NFL, the
particular barriers minority coaches seeking NFL head coaching positions have
faced, and the effort to level the playing field for such coaches. Part I of this
article traces the NFL's initial expulsion of African Americans, its eventual
reintegration, and the patterns accompanying that reintegration. Part I1 explores
the travails of the NFL's first three post-reintegration coaches of color as well as
statistical evidence revealing that, as of 2002, NFL coaches of color generally
suffered inferior opportunities despite exhibiting outstanding performance. Part
III examines the campaign launched by attorneys Cyrus Mehri and Johnnie L.
Cochran, Jr. to alter NFL teams' hiring practices, the creation of the Rooney

little hockey, discrimination in hockey has been rooted in national origin, dividing "French-Canadian
Kenneth L.
and European players from their American and Anglo-Canadian counterparts."
Shropshire, Minority Issues in Contemporary Sports, 15 Stan L. & Pol'y Rev. 189, 191 n.9 (2004)
(citing Lawrence M. Kahn, Discrimination in Professional Sports: A Survey of the Literature, 44
Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 395 (1991)).
2

See Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. & Cyrus Mehri, Black Coaches in the National Football League:

Superior

Performance,

Inferior

Opportunities

1

(2002),

http://web2.customwebexpress.com/meska/UserFiles/File/Repor__SuperiorPerformancelnferiorOpportunities.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2008) (noting as of 2002, only
1.5% of the 400 coaches in NFL history were African-American).
3 See Brian W. Collins, Note, Tackling Unconscious Bias in Hiring Practices: The Plight of the
Rooney Rule, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 870, 877-884 (2007) (discussing coaching opportunities for African
Americans in the NBA and NFL); Shropshire, Minority Issues in Contemporary Sports, supra note 1,
at 203-05 (noting baseball was "impetus" for diversity initiatives creating opportunities for African
Americans in managerial and coaching positions).
4 Tony Dungy and Herman Edwards were the NFL's only head coaches of color in 2002. Gary Myers,
Sunday Morning QB: Black Coaches Try to Get in the Game, N.Y. Daily News, Oct. 6, 2002, at 70.
As of 2002, Art Shell, Dennis Green, and Ray Rhodes were the only other people of color to have held
NFL head coaching positions in the League's modem era. Id.
5 Steve Wieberg, Division I-A Tackles Minority Hiring: Unlike NFL's Rooney Rule, ADs' Directive
Will Only Encourage, Not Require, Action, USA Today, Oct. 3, 2007, at IC.
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Rule (the "Rule"), and the birth of the Fritz Pollard Alliance of minority coaches,
scouts, and front office personnel in the NFL. Finally, Part IV traces the Rooney
Rule's success in creating equal opportunity for coaches of color in the NFL.

1. A HISTORY OF RACIAL

EXCLUSION

A. Fritz Pollard and the NFL's Initial Racial Expulsion
During the mid-1920's, the American Professional Football Association
("APFA"), now known as the NFL, began homogenizing, and by 1934, it had
succeeded in expurgating all African Americans. 6 In doing so, it ended the
APFA career of Frederick Douglas "Fritz" Pollard. 7
Pollard entered the APFA in 1919 as a running back with the Akron Pros
and was, by any estimate, a remarkable talent.8 As elusive as he was fast,
Pollard earned All-American Honors as a half-back at Brown University and led
the Bruins to their first and only Rose' Bowl appearance before graduating and
pursing a professional football career. 9 For Pollard, often the only black player
on the field, playing football was equal parts sport and survival, as opposing
players, after he was tackled, routinely piled on him with intent to injure.'° Still,
Pollard was as effective with Akron as he was at Brown, and, in his second
professional season, he led the Pros to the league championship title. ''
Pollard's legacy, however, lies not on the actual playing field but on the
sidelines: He became the APFA's first black coach, an extraordinary
accomplishment considering the racial preconceptions of the day. Those
preconceptions, which still endure to some degree, presupposed his physical
fortitude just as they presupposed his intellectual frailty. 12 So while the
accomplishments of the era's black players unsettled the American sporting
community because blacks, despite their presumed brawn, were believed
6 Shropshire, In Black and White: Race and Sports in America, supra note 1, at 30 (citing Arthur R.
Ashe, Jr., A Hard Road to Glory: A History of the African-American Athlete Since 1946 99 (1988)).
7 See Fritz Pollard Biography, http://www.profootballhof.com/hof/member.jsp?player-id=242 (last
visited Mar. 30, 2008) (noting Fritz Pollard's last season).
' See Official Site of the Pro Football Hall of Fame, supra note 7 (describing Fritz Pollard as one of the
most feared running backs in the APFA).
9 Official Site of the Pro Football Hall of Fame, supra note 7.
10See Joe Burnis, Forgotten Pioneer: Fritz Pollard was the NFL's First Black Coach (and the QB on a
Champion Team) but Almost No One Knows His Name, Boston Globe, Feb. 18, 2004, at Fl
(interviewing Fritz Pollard's grandson about his grandfather's football stories). Pollard met with such
consistent brutality that he developed a mechanism of punishing those who sought to punish him after
a tackle. Id. Upon hitting the ground, Pollard rolled on to his back, raised his feet into the air and
waved them as if riding a bicycle while simultaneously propelling himself to an upright position. Id.
11Id.
12Richard Lapchick, Sport in Society: Equal Opportunity or Business as Usual? 9-10 (1995).
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insufficiently sophisticated to excel in team sport,' 3 Pollard's ascension to the
coaching ranks shook sport to its core. Despite Pollard's accomplishments-or,
perhaps, because of them and what they portended-the NFL teams' owners
mutually agreed to force blacks out of the League, ending Pollard's APFA
coaching career soon after it began. 14
B. The NFL's Re-integration
Two decades later, the League began to re-integrate, but the stereotype of the
physically superior yet intellectually inferior black would endure and impact
opportunities for blacks in the League through the end of the twentieth century
and beyond.
In 1946, the Los Angeles Rams became the first NFL team in twelve years
to employ black players. 15 Interestingly, the Rams' decision to integrate its
squad was not a bold repudiation of segregation, but rather a necessary
consequence of the team's move from Cleveland to Los Angeles.' 6 The
commissioners of the Los Angeles Coliseum, in which the team would play,
insisted as part of the stadium agreement that the Rams desegregate. The Rams
agreed to do so,' 7 and UCLA alums Kenny Washington and Woody Strode
joined the Rams as the team's-and League's-only black players. Is Notably, the
positions Washington and Strode played, wide receiver and running back, are the
paradigmatic football "workhorse positions"-positions viewed as demanding
more physical ability than intellectual ability.' 9 That a running back and a wide
receiver were the first black players permitted to enter the league in twelve years
is no coincidence. Indeed, as blacks slowly trickled into the League during the
2°
succeeding years, they trickled disproportionately into workhorse positions.
"[F]ootball's thinking and control position," quarterback, on the other hand,
remained reserved for whites. 2' As of the 1968 season's inception, twenty-two
years after Washington's and Strode's debut, the NFL featured no black
13Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of Racism in College Athletics, 22
Fordham Urb. L.J. 615, 645 (1995) (citing Harry Edwards, Sociology of Sport 38 (1973)).
14Shropshire, In Black and White: Race and Sports in America, supra note 1,at 30.
15 Id.

16See Sports Business News, The Great One, McLean and Wirtz as Far From Lord Stanley as They'll

Ever Be, http://sportsbiznews.blogspot.com/2007_04_I 5_archive.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
17Id.

18Shropshire, In Black and White: Race and Sports in America, supra note I, at 30. Bill Willis and
Marion Motley joined the NFL's Cleveland Browns later that season. Id.
19Richard E. Lapchick, Smashing Barriers: Race and Sport in the New Millennium 229 (2001).
20See id. (suggesting African Americans have historically occupied brawny positions requiring less
intelligence).
21 Id.
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quarterbacks. 22 And during those twenty-two years, the League's only black
quarterbacking presence was Willie Thrower, who, in 1953, entered just two
games as a backup, completed three of eight pass attempts, and never played in
the League again. 23 In 1969, James "Shack" Harris became the first black player
24
to open an NFL regular season as a starting quarterback, and he proceeded to
have a productive twelve-year career, during which he was, in 1975, selected for
the NFL Pro Bowl team and named the Pro Bowl game's Most Valuable
Player. 25 Harris' success, however, did little to alter NFL teams' approaches to
staffing the quarterback position, and black NFL quarterbacks remained a rarity.
Doug Williams' extraordinary career, during which he quarterbacked the
Washington Redskins to a 1987 Super Bowl victory and garnered Super Bowl
Most Valuable Player honors,2 6 did little more than Harris' to eradicate the myth
that blacks are not well-suited for the position.
In fact, as of 1998, in the history of the NFL's annual college draft, only
three black quarterbacks had been selected in the draft's first round. 27 The

22 See Marlin Briscoe Biography, http://www.marlinbriscoefootball.com/biography.html (last visited
Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Marlin Briscoe].
Remembering Thrower's
23 Len Pasquarelli,

Contribution,

ESPN,

Feb.

21,

2002,

http://espn.go.com/nfl/columns/pasquarellilen/1338017.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
24 See James Harris, http://jaguars.com/team/scout.aspx?id=2409 (last visited Mar. 30, 2008)
(presenting James Harris's biography). During the previous year, Marlin Briscoe, a black quarterback,
started a regular-season game for the Denver Broncos. However, at the time the Denver Broncos
played in the American Football League rather than the NFL. Marlin Briscoe, supra note 22. The
leagues merged two years later in 1970. African-American Sports Greats: A Biographical Dictionary
305 (David L. Porter, ed., 1995) [hereinafter African-American Sports Greats]. Ironically, Harris
completed some of his 1969 passes to Briscoe, whom the Broncos traded to the Bills and the Bills
converted to a wide receiver. Marlin Briscoe, supra note 22.
Notably, generations of black college quarterbacks would suffer Briscoe's fate as they entered an NFL
largely inhospitable to black quarterbacks. See Lapchick, supra note 19, at 228 (noting that as of
1998, 91% of all quarterbacks in the NFL were white). The trend continues even today. Indeed, two
of the 2006 Super Bowl champion Pittsburgh Steelers' best wide receivers-Antwaan Randle-El and
Hines

Ward-played

the

quarterback

position

in

college.

About

Antwaan,

http://www.antwaanrandleel.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Randle-EI]; About
Hines, http://hinesward.fsmgsports.comlmain.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Ward].
While Ward played quarterback, running back and wide receiver at the University of Georgia, RandelEl was strictly a quarterback at Indiana University and was one of the nation's best, placing sixth in
balloting for the Heisman Trophy, an annual award given to college football's best player. Andrew
Bagnato, Huskers' Crouch Proves Best Option; Nebraska QB Edges Grossman; Randle El 6th, Chi.
Trib., Dec. 9, 2001, at CI; Randle-EI, supra; Ward, supra.
25James Harris, supra note 24.
26See Shropshire, In Black and White: Race and Sports in America, supra note I, at 45 (noting Doug
Williams's Super Bowl MVP accomplishment).
27Lapchick, supra note 19, at 228.
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following year seemed to portend a breakthrough, as the 1999 draft alone
28
featured three teams selecting black quarterbacks with first round picks.
Nearly a decade later, however, black quarterbacks remain disproportionately
rare. According to Dr. Richard Lapchick, Director of the University of Central
Florida's DeVos Sport Business Management Program, sixty-seven percent
(67%) of the NFL's players are black. 29 Of the thirty-two starting quarterbacks
on NFL rosters at the beginning of the 2007 season, however, only six were
black-just under twenty percent (20%).3 °
As daunting as the barriers facing black quarterbacks have been, the barriers
facing black coaches have been far more burdensome. The presumption of
intellectual inferiority but physical superiority obviously hampers the black
candidate seeking a quarterback position, for which both physical and
intellectual ability are deemed necessary.
The presumption, however,
completely handicaps the black candidate pursuing a coaching position, a
position for which physical ability is irrelevant and intellectual ability-the
candidate's presumed weakness-is paramount. Saddled with a presumption of
intellectual inferiority, therefore, blacks have struggled to find head coaching
positions in the NFL. 3 '
Indeed, between 1946, when Strode and Washington
re-integrated the NFL, and the beginning of the 1989 season, every head coach in
the League was white,32 despite an increase in the proportion of black NFL
3
players during that period from zero to sixty-seven percent (67%).1
II. THE PLIGHT OF THE BLACK NFL HEAD COACH
During the 1989 season, the NFL's Los Angeles Raiders bucked a sixty-year
tradition of maintaining Caucasian homogeneity among the League's head
coaches by hiring Art Shell to lead the team.34 Unfortunately, Shell's emergence
would do little to increase equal employment opportunity for black coaches in
the NFL. A survey of Shell's experience and the experiences of the black head
28

Id. The three black quarterbacks selected in the 1999 draft's first round were Daunte Culpepper,

Akili Smith, and Donovan McNabb. Id.
29Richard Lapchick, The 2006 Racial and Gender Report Card: National Football League 3 (2006),
http://www.bus.ucf.edu/sport/public/downloads/2006-RGRC_NFL[ ].pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
30 The names of these quarterbacks are Jason Campbell, David Garrard, Tarvaris Jackson, Donovan
McNabb, Steve McNair, and Vince Young. Donovan McNabb tells HBO Black QBs Face Greater
Scrutiny, ESPN, Sept. 18, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section--nfl&id=3025563 (last
visited Mar. 29, 2008).
31 See Cochran, Jr. & Mehri, supra note 2, at I (documenting under-representation of African
Americans among the NFL's coaching ranks).
32Shropshire, In Black and White: Race and Sports in America, supra note I, at 79.
33Cochran, Jr. & Mehri, supra note 2, at I.
3 Shropshire, In Black and White: Race and Sports in America, supra note I, at 79.
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coaches who followed him is revealing.
Shell took control of the Raiders midseason, when the team had a record of
one win and three losses, following the organization's first two consecutive
losing seasons in twenty-five years. 35 In his first full season as head coach,
however, Shell transformed the team's fortunes, leading the Raiders to twelve
wins and only four loses in route to the NFL's American Football Conference
Championship game. 36 Despite amassing an impressive fifty-six wins against
forty-one loses over the following four years and posting winning records during
three of those four seasons, including the final two, Shell was fired after the 1994
season. 37 His firing was undeserved, as the Raiders' owner Al Davis would
apologetically admit twelve years later.
In 1992, two years before Shell's termination, Dennis Green became the
second black coach in the NFL's modem era when he accepted the Minnesota
Vikings' head coaching position. 39 Green sparkled. During his ten years with
the Vikings, the team won a remarkable sixty-three percent (63%) of its games,
40
More
and in one year, 1998, won fifteen of its sixteen regular season games.
impressive still, Green led his team to eight playoff appearances-a feat surpassed
41
by only one NFL coach during the fifteen years between 1986 and 2001 -and
two Conference championship games. 42 After the first losing season of his NFL
career-a season doomed from the start by the tragic death of one of the team's
best and most beloved players-Green was fired, despite being the most
successful coach in the team's history 3
In 1996, the Tampa Bay Buccaneers, historically one of the worst teams in
44
During his six-year tenure,
the NFL, hired Tony Dungy as its head coach.
Dungy transformed the Buccaneers, a team that had enjoyed a mere two winning
45
Dungy led the
seasons in its twenty-two years of existence, into a powerhouse.
appearance
championship
one
conference
and
team to four playoff appearances
during those six years and lost more games than he won only once-in his first
35African-American Sports Greats, supra note 24, at 305.
36 Id.

37 Id.; Cochran, Jr. & Mehri, supra note 2, at 11.
38 Mark Purdy, Return to Team's Past Good Way to Forge Bright Future in Oakland, San Jose Mercury
News, Feb. 12, 2006, at Sp. 1.
31Cochran, Jr. & Mehri, supra note 2, at 6-7.
4 Id. at 7.
41 Id. During that time period, Marty Schottenheimer led his team to nine playoff appearances and
Mary Levy, like Green, led his team to eight. Id. at 7 & n.9.
42

Id. at 7.

43Cochran, Jr. & Mehri, supra note 2, at 12.
4 Id.
45 See

at 7.
id. at 7-8 (describing team's transformation under Dungy).
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season.46 Yet, after the 2001 season, he was fired.47 The absurdity of his firing
on the heels of such success is best understood in the context of the
organization's previous head coach firings:

Before Dungy, Sam Wyche coached the Buccaneers for four losing seasons before
being fired. Before Wyche, Richard Williamson coached the Buccaneers for two
losing seasons before being fired. Before Williamson, Ray Perkins coached the
Buccaneers for four losing seasons before being fired.45

Dungy coached the Buccaneers for five straight non-losing seasons,
established a tradition of excellence, and was fired.49
While these anecdotal accounts certainly suggest inequitable
employment opportunities for black head coaches in the NFL, statistical analysis
offers confirmation. In 2002, civil rights attorneys Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. 50 and
Cyrus Mehri 5' commissioned University of Pennsylvania economist Dr. Janice
Madden to analyze the performance of NFL head coaches during the fifteen
years between 1986 and 2001 and to compare the success of the five black head
coaches who coached during that period against the success of the eighty-six
white head coaches who coached during the same period.5 2 Dr. Madden
concluded that, by any standard, the black head coaches outperformed the white
head coaches: "No matter how we look at success, black coaches are performing
better. These data are consistent with blacks having to be better coaches than the
53
whites in order to get a job as head coach in the NFL.,
Indeed, in every category Dr. Madden studied, black coaches outperformed
white coaches. 54 In terms of total wins per season-the primary category upon
which a head coach's performance is assessed 55-black coaches averaged over

46 Id.

at 7-8; see Tony Dungy Stats, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/players/coach?id=8 (last visited Mar.

30,2008).
47Id. at 12.
48Id.
49Id. at 12, Exhibit C at 7-8.
so
Johnnie
L.

Cochran,
Jr.,
Biography,
available
at
http://www.cochranfirm.com/pdf/CochranBrochure.pdf, at 2 (last visited Apr. 9, 2008).
51 Cyrus Mehri Biography, http://www.findjustice.com/sub/cyrus-mehri.jsp (last visited Mar. 30,
2008).
52 Cochran, Jr. & Mehri, supra note 2, at
ii, 2.
53Id. at Exhibit B at 3.
5 See id. at Exhibit B at I-3 ("In each and every one of these comparisons, black coaches have a
stronger record than white coaches.").
55See id. at ii (noting that wins and losses are "the currency of football and all team sports").
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56
While the 1.1 win
nine wins, while white coaches averaged eight wins.
differential might, at first blush, seem a minor matter, considering that NFL
teams play only sixteen games during each regular season, one additional win is
extremely significant. 57 Further, no win is more significant than the ninth, as,
during the fifteen years studied, sixty percent (60%) of teams winning nine
games advanced to the playoffs while only ten percent (10%) of teams winning
eight games advanced to the playoffs.58
The disparity in success is even more pronounced when considering
59
In their first seasons, black
coaches' success in their first seasons with a team.
coaches averaged 2.7 more wins than did white coaches in their first seasons and,
accordingly, were far more likely to advance their teams to the playoffs than
were white coaches. 60
In addition, in their last seasons before being fired, black coaches
outperformed their white counterparts. 6' Black coaches won an average of 1.3
more games in their terminal years than white coaches, and while twenty percent
(20%) of the black coaches who were fired led their teams to the playoffs in the
62
year of their firing, only eight percent (8%) of white coaches did the same.

1i.

THE CAMPAIGN TO CHANGE THE

NFL

Based on Dr. Madden's results, Cochran and Mehri authored a report
entitled Black Coaches in the National FootballLeague: SuperiorPerformances,
Inferior Opportunities. They concluded that black head coaches faced more
exacting standards than white head coaches and were often dismissed under
63
circumstances that would not have resulted in white head coaches' dismissals.
As stark as Madden's results were, Mehri and Cochran did not conclude that
black head coaches were somehow inherently better than white head coaches.
Rather, they concluded that because barriers to entry were more formidable for
black coaches seeking head coaching positions than for white coaches, the black
coaches able to surmount those barriers were exceedingly well equipped to
succeed as head coaches. Additionally, as a consequence of those exceedingly
high barriers, they argued that many black assistant coaches never received

6 Id. at 2.

57 See id. (recognizing a one-win difference often determines whether a team is successful in reaching
the playoffs).
58 Id.
" Id. at 3.
0 Id.
61 Id. at 4.
62 Id.

63 See id. at i-ii.
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serious consideration for head coaching jobs. 64 Cochran and Mehri's report
ultimately concluded that despite statistically "superior performance," black
coaches have received "inferior opportunities": "In case after case, NFL owners
have shown more interest in-and patience with-white coaches who don't win
than black coaches who do." 65

Armed with this conclusion and statistically significant analyses to support
it, Cochran and Mehri possessed critical information in confronting employment
discrimination: persuasive evidence that the discrimination actually exists. Over
forty years after Congress issued broad-based anti-discriminatory legislative
edicts, Americans are reluctant to acknowledge the discrimination still existing
in their organizations. 66 Racial bias and discrimination in America are now
6
more subtle than overt, and, according to some scholars, often subconscious. 1
Consequently, the suggestion that racial discrimination exists may, and often
does, strike institutions' executives as inaccurate and offensive, prompting fierce
denials and dampening the possibility of sincere and meaningful settlement
negotiations.6"
Statistically significant evidence of systemic discrimination buttressed by
anecdotal evidence of that discrimination's impact-as opposed to anecdotal
evidence alone-is often crucial in prompting institutions to honestly confront the
existence of discrimination. Equipped with such statistical evidence, Cochran
and Mehri were able to convince the NFL, which to its credit had previously
expressed concern about the lack of diversity among its head coaches,69 that
some level of cooperation, as opposed to confrontation, was in order. Indeed,
shortly after the report's publication, the League created a committee dedicated
to increasing equal employment opportunities for coaching candidates.7 °
Consisting of the owners of several teams and chaired by Pittsburgh Steelers'
owner Dan Rooney, the Workplace Diversity Committee set out to consider the

4 See id. at8- 10.
" Id. at ii.
66 See Shropshire, In Black and White: Race and Sports in America, supra note I, at 10 (discussing
various methods individuals use to underplay their discriminatory hiring practices).
67 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 323 (1987); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and
Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 803, 829 (2004).
68 See William L. Kandel, Practicing Law Institute: Litigation and Administrative Practice Course
Handbook Series, 682 Practical L. Inst. 469, 483 (2002) (explaining that attacking the character of
executives in negotiations as racist often hampers the ability to reach meaningful solutions).
69See Collins, supra note 3, at 884 (noting ex-NFL commissioner Paul Tagliabue's efforts to increase
minority hiring before the Rooney Rule's inception).
'0Id. at 886.
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remedial recommendations Cochran and Mehri proffered. 7
A. Crafting the Rooney Rule
The most notable of Cochran and Mehri's recommendations was the
mandatory interview rule. Arguing that racial bias, whether conscious or
unconscious, was steering teams away from minority head coaching candidates,
Cochran and Mehri contended that NFL teams should be made to do what few
had theretofore done-grant minority candidates meaningful head coach job
interviews. 72 They believed that minority candidates would exhibit preparedness
for head coaching jobs, and simply needed the opportunities to compete for the
positions. 3
Cochran and Mehri, therefore, suggested that each NFL team
searching for a head coach be required to interview at least one minority
candidate before making its hire. 74 Crucial to the suggestion was that the
interview actually be meaningful-that it be an in-person interview and that the
interviewers be among the team's primary decision-makers. 75
After some deliberation, the Workplace Diversity Committee recommended
the rule to the broader group of NFL team owners, and the owners agreed by
acclimation to implement it. 76 All parties agreed the rule should require nothing
beyond a meaningful interview, and if after the interview the interviewing team
chose to hire a non-minority coach, the choice was its to make. 77 In December
of 2002, the NFL announced its mandatory interview rule, which would come to
be known as the Rooney Rule (the "Rule") in honor of the Workplace Diversity
Committee's chairman, Dan Rooney, 7s and which would prove to fundamentally
change the NFL. 79
°
From the start, the Rooney Rule was met with significant skepticism.8
Indeed, criticism rained down from all quarters. NFL insiders questioned the

71 Id.

72See Cochran & Mehri, supra note 65, at 15.
73See id. at 14.
74
See id. at 15.
75See Collins, supra note 3, at 901-04 (discussing problem of"sham" interviews with the Rooney Rule
and difficulty of measuring franchises' good faith efforts in interviewing minority candidates during
hiring processes).
76See id. at 886 (noting that the NFL Committee on Workplace Diversity's suggestions were adopted
by all thirty-two NFL owners).
77Id.
78 Greg Garber, Thanks to the Rooney Rule, Doors Opened, ESPN, Feb. 9, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/playoffsO6/news/story?id=2750645 (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
79See id. (discussing the effects of the Rooney Rule on the NFL).
80 E.g. Jay Nordinger, Color in Coaching, National Review, Sept. 1, 2003, available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/flashback/nordlinger200504200048.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
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League's decision to take its lead in pursuing diversity from two lawyers
previously unaffiliated with the League and its internal mechanisms. If anyone
should guide the League on these issues, they argued, he or she should be from
the football community-from a group of NFL alums or from the League's, or
one of its teams', front offices. Others, recognizing the Rule contained no
accompanying penalty mechanism, wondered whether teams would bother to
heed the Rule, and if they didn't, whether the League would do anything about
their failures to do so. 8 ' Still others argued that even assuming teams followed
the Rule, because the interviewing team had no obligation to hire a minority
coach, the interview would prove merely ornamental."
Burdened with these
criticisms, the Rooney Rule's early life was shaky.
B. The Birth of an Alliance
Those questioning the propriety of the NFL's reliance on outsiders to guide
its equal employment opportunity efforts would soon be silenced.
Shortly after Cochran and Mehri issued their report, Floyd Keith, the
Executive Director of the Black Coaches Association ("BCA"), an advocacy
organization of black collegiate coaches,13 suggested the lawyers consult with
John Wooten, a former NFL All-Pro offensive lineman well-known throughout
84
the League for his tenacity and intellectual acuity both on and off the field.
While Wooten was a remarkable player, he made his most lasting impact in NFL
front offices, where he worked in various high-level capacities with the Dallas
Cowboys, the Philadelphia Eagles, and the Baltimore Ravens over the course of
almost thirty years.85 More impressive than Wooten's success as a player or
front office executive, however, was his unwavering and expressed commitment
to racial equality in the NFL. For years, Wooten decried the homogenous
composition of the NFL's head coaching ranks. Having played with and against
scores of fellow black players who he knew would, if given the opportunity,
excel as NFL head coaches, Wooten was incensed at their exclusion.
Cochran and Mehri's report offered quantitative support for what Wooten

81 See Collins supra note 3, at 871 (noting that the Rooney Rule appeared "vague and inefficient" at
first).
2 Id. at 902.
83 In 2007, the Black Coaches Association changed its name to the Black Coaches and Administrators,
and now encompasses black collegiate sports administrators as well.

Erika P. Thompson, Black

Coaches Association Announces Name Change, Black Coaches & Administrators, Jul. 6, 2007,
http://bcasports.cstv.con/genrel/072007aaa.html. (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
s' See John Wooten Bio, http://www.fpal.org/wooten.php

(last visited Mar. 30, 2008) (noting

Wooten's various work as a football player and front office executive).
85Id.
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knew: with a fair chance to take the reigns of an NFL team, black head coaches
would perform as well, if not better than, white head coaches. Wooten also
knew that many black coaches in the League who had consistently been passed
over for head coaching positions were anxious to meaningfully compete for
those positions and would support the lawyers' efforts. Wooten committed to
assisting Cochran and Mehri's work in any way he could and suggested they
travel to Indianapolis, Indiana, in February of 2003 to meet with the NFL's black
coaches during the NFL Scouting Combine (the "Combine"). The Combine,
which serves as a nearly week-long tryout for collegiate players seeking NFL
86
jobs, is the one occasion when all of the League's teams and their staffs can be
counted on to be in one place, and therefore presented the perfect opportunity for
Cochran and Mehri to meet and share ideas with those they were hoping to help.
The lawyers recognized that in order to initiate true reform in the NFL, the
primary stakeholders would have to engage in the battle, and they hoped a
meting at the Combine would galvanize their interest in organizing as a unit.
Although Cochran was unable to attend, Mehri represented them both at the
Combine. What Mehri imagined would be a gathering of a few dozen black
coaches turned out to be a meeting of over one hundred black coaches, scouts,
and front office personnel, all deeply concerned about equity in the NFL. The
group, though, was not a monolith. Some in the room expressed reluctance to
push the NFL and its teams too vociferously for fear of backlash. Others,
exceedingly frustrated with lack of opportunity, felt no push could be hard
enough. Still others staked out middle positions. Overwhelmingly, however,
those in the room supported increased organization. They wanted to maintain a
connection in order that there be a forum in which to engage issues that they
shared. And they did so, forming an organization and naming it in honor of the
individual who preceded and inspired them all. They became the Fritz Pollard
Alliance (the "FPA"), an affinity group dedicated to equal opportunity of
employment in the coaching, scouting, and front office ranks of the NFL.87
There was little doubt Wooten would serve as the fledging organization's
chairman, guiding its vision and maintaining a strong relationship with the NFL,
where he had over the years developed many close contacts and personal
friendships. And when Wooten considered who might effectively manage the
organization's affairs and serve as its public face, a few individuals came to
mind, but none more compelling than Kellen Winslow, Sr.
Winslow, one of the NFL's all time great players, was a tight end with the
League's San Diego Chargers from 1979 - 1987, during which time he set

86

NFL Scouting Combine, http://www.nflcombine.net/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).

87Collins, supra note 3, at 887.
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numerous League records and revolutionized the position."8 Whereas tight ends
before Winslow were primarily utilized as blockers and rarely called upon to
catch anything other than short passes, Winslow combined superior blocking
9
skill with speed and pass-catching ability to rival even the best wide receivers.8
Along with his physical abilities, Winslow mixed intelligence, dogged
persistence, and compelling leadership ability to become a Hall of Fame
player, 9° the type of player capable of willing his team to win. 9 , Because of
these characteristics and his tremendous success as a player, Winslow naturally
presumed he would, upon retirement, have opportunities to work in the NFL or
in major conference collegiate football. 92 Retirement, however, brought with it a
crushing realization when the opportunities he envisioned did not materialize.
As Winslow described in his forward to In Black and White: Race and Sports in
America, Kenneth Shropshire's incisive investigation of the intersection of race
and sport:

As long as I was on the field of play I was treated and viewed differently than
most African-American men in this country. Because of my physical abilities,
society accepted and even catered to me. Race was not an issue. Then reality
came calling. After a nine-year career in the National Football League filled with
honors and praises, I stepped into the real world and realized... I was just another
nigger ... the images and stereotypes that applied to African-American men in
88See Jay Paris, Browns' Winslow is the Mouth that Roars, North County Times, Nov. 2, 2006,
available
at
http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2006/ll/03/sports/professional/chargers/21 02_5411_2_06.txt (last
visited Mar. 30, 2008) (claming that Kellen Winslow revolutionized the tight end position).
89See NFL 1980 League Leaders, http://www.pro-football-reference.com/years/leadersl980.htm (last
visited Mar. 30, 2008) (showing Winslow second in the league in receiving yards).
90 The Pro Football Hall of Fame inducted Winslow in 1995. Kellen Winslow Biography,
http://www.profootballhof.com/hof/member.jsp?playerid=233 (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
" Winslow's capability in this regard is perhaps best illustrated by his performance in a 1982 Chargers
playoff victory over the Miami Dolphins, a performance ranking among the greatest individual
performances in NFL history. See Page 2 Staff, The List: Best NFL Playoff Performances, ESPN,
http://espn.go.com/page2/s/list/NFLplayoffperform.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2008) (ranking
Winslow's performance the second greatest playoff performance of all time). During that game,
Winslow refused to accept defeat. Despite being treated throughout the game for severe cramps,
dehydration, a pinched nerve in his shoulder, and a gash in his lower lip requiring stitches, Winslow
caught thirteen passes for 166 yards, scored a touchdown, and blocked a Miami Dolphin field goal that
would have given the Dolphins the victory. Dan Ralph, The Reluctant Superstar, NFL Canada, Oct.
16, 2007, http://www.nflcanada.com/News/FeatureWriters/Ralph Dan/2007/10/16/4581021 .html (last
visited Mar. 30, 2008).
92Kellen Winslow, Foreword to Shropshire, In Black and White: Race and Sports in America, supra
note 1,at xii."
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this country attached to me.

93

Winslow's revelation led him to channel his talents toward exposing
inequity in the sports industry, and when he agreed to serve as the FPA's
Executive Director, he carried that passion with him.
As a consequence of the FPA's support, the Rule, which was just a few
months earlier decried as the brainchild of outside agitators, suddenly enjoyed
endorsement from a body representing coaches, scouts, and front office
personnel of color throughout the League. The Rooney Rule had gained instant
credibility.
IV. THE ROONEY RULE: APPLIED

Credibility, however, offered no guarantee of efficacy, and if the Rule
were to be effective, it would need teeth. Detroit Lions' General Manager Matt
Millen's approach to hiring a new head coach in 2003 would ensure that it had
them. In January of that year, the Lions fired their head coach Marty
Momhinweg, after the team suffered through a lackluster season during which
they lost thirteen games and won only three. 94 Three weeks earlier, the San
Francisco 49ers had fired their longtime head coach, Steve Mariucci. 95 Millen
wanted Mariucci to lead the Lions, and he expressed little interest in maintaining
an open mind to other potential candidates. In his single-minded pursuit of
96
Mariucci, Millen hired Mariucci without interviewing any candidates of color.
While such a hiring process would have been unobjectionable just a few months
earlier, under the Rooney Rule it was facially non-compliant.
The NFL's then-Commissioner, Paul Tagliabue, had his test case, and his
response would determine the Rule's fate. If Tagliabue responded with inaction
or an empty condemnation, the Rule would be rendered useless as a change
agent. It would exist as little more than a symbolic gesture, creating the

9' Id. at xi.
94

NFL

Football

Standings,

http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/standings?season=2002&breakdown=3&split-0

ESPN,
(last visited Mar. 30,

2008).
5 Lions

Hire
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as

Head

Coach,

Canadian

Broadcasting

Centre,

Feb.

5,

2003,

http://www.cbc.ca/sportslstory/2003/02/03/mariucciO30203.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
96 Collins, supra note 3, at 900-01. Ironically, Mariucci, the coach Millen pursued with such myopia,
performed quite poorly as the Lions head coach. During his two-plus seasons with the team, Mariucci
amassed a record of fifteen wins and twenty-eight losses and was ultimately terminated in the middle
of the 2005 season. Skip Wood, After Digesting Turkey Day Debacle, Lions Fire Mariucci, USA
Today, Nov. 28, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/lions/2005-11-28mariucci-x.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).

VOL.7:2

VIRGINIA SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL

SPRING 2008

impression of a League dedicated to equal employment opportunity for coaches
of color in the NFL but having no actual impact. If, on the other hand, Tagliabue
substantially punished the Lions, he would signal the NFL's commitment to the
Rooney Rule and to the equity Cochran, Mehri, and the FPA sought to achieve.
Tagliabue's decision shocked even those hoping for a stout punishment.
Explaining that Millen "did not take sufficient steps to satisfy the commitment
that [the Lions] made" regarding the Rooney Rule, Tagliabue fined Millen
$200,000, and explicated that Millen, not the team for which he worked, would
have to pay the fine. 97 With the fine, Tagliabue made clear that as the Lions'
principle decision-maker, Millen was responsible for following the League's
mandatory interview guidelines, and he would have to pay account.
Notably, Tagliabue did not stop at issuing the fine. He went further still,
moving away from the facts of the Lions' non-adherence and issuing broadbased notice as to the League's unwavering commitment to the Rule. The next
principle decision-maker to flout the Rule would, Tagliabue promised, suffer a
$500,000 fine. 98
While the FPA celebrated Tagliabue's response to the Lions' head coach
hiring process as revealing that the "'Rooney Rule' ha[d] finally arrived," 99
Tagliabue's actions sparked outrage among Rooney Rule opponents and others
who felt it was excessive. 100 After all, it did not appear Millen was seeking to
exclude from consideration minority candidates to the benefit of a group of
Caucasian candidates. He was, rather, committed to hiring a particular personSteve Mariucci-and was uninterested in considering any other candidate,
regardless of race. 1° 1 If the Rule applied in this circumstance, they argued,
future decision-makers interested in a particular candidate would offer an
interview to a minority candidate simply to fulfill the Rule and for no other
reason. 102 This criticism exposed an obvious potential weakness in the Rule.
While the Rule requires a team to grant a minority candidate a meaningful
97Bram A. Maravent, Is the Rooney Rule Affirmative Action?: Analyzing the NFL's Mandate to its
Clubs Regarding Coaching and Front Office Hires, 13 Sports Law. J.233,243 (2006).
98 Millen Fined for Not Interviewing Minority Candidates, ESPN, July 5, 2003,
http://espn.go.com/nfl/news/2003/0725/1585560.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
99 Millen Fined $200K for not Interviewing Minority Candidates, CBS Sports, July 5, 2003,
http://cbs.sportsline.com/nfl/story/6498949 (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
1ooCurt Sylvester, Detroit Lions Owner Lashes Out at NFL in Response to Diversity Fine, Detroit Free
Press, July 29, 2003, at Al.
'o' It merits noting that Millen did invite candidates of color to interview for the Lions' head coaching
position, but recognizing that Millen had already decided to hire Mariucci and that the interviews to
which they were being invited would be pro forma, and thus not meaningful, none of the invitees
accepted. Collins, supra note 3, at 901.
'02See id. at 902 (discussing the possibility of "sham" interviews for minority coaching candidates).
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interview, it is incapable of directing state of mind. The Rule, therefore, cannot
require that a team grant a candidate meaningful consideration. Thus, the Rule is
powerless to prevent the inconsequential interview-the interview with all the
trappings of meaningfulness but whose outcome is predetermined.
The Rule's critics cited this reality as evidence the Rule would be ultimately
ineffectual. 103 However, many commentators believe that, more often than one
might initially intuit, a face-to-face, in-person, interview with an organization's
primary decision-makers begets meaningful consideration-that sitting down
together and discussing at length a common interest potentially melts away
conscious or subconscious preconceptions and stereotypes that might otherwise
color decision-makers' judgments.'°4 As such, the Rule's supporters argued that
despite being a process-oriented rule with no hiring mandate, the Rule carried the
power to markedly increase diversity among NFL head coaches. 105
The proponents' belief was borne out. Indeed, over the course of the several
years following its implementation, the Rule has markedly increased diversity
among NFL head coaches.' 0 6 At the time of the Rule's implementation in 2002,
two minorities held NFL head coaching positions. °7 Four years later, minority
head coaches led seven of the NFL's thirty-two teams. 18 While this progress
may not be entirely attributable to the Rule, the Rule has undoubtedly played a
role despite critics' claims that a "meaningful" interview would not spark truly
meaningful consideration.
Consider the Cincinnati Bengals' 2003 search for a head coach. Prior to that
year, the Bengals had never, in franchise history, hired a person of color for its
head coach position. 09 In fact, the Bengals had never even interviewed a person
of color for one of its top three coaching positions (head coach, offensive
coordinator, and defensive coordinator)."10 Under the Rooney Rule, the Bengals
had to do something they had never done nor indicated desire in doing-they had
to interview a minority candidate for their head coaching vacancy. With the
opportunity to convince the Bengals of his merit, Marvin Lewis, a renowned
103Nordlinger, supra note 80.
'04 See Shropshire, In Black and White: Race and Sports in America, supra note 1, at 37-38 (discussing

positive effect of Carol Moseley Braun's election to the United States Senate on the sensitivity to
issues affecting minorities).
105See Cochran, Jr. & Mehri, supra note 2, at 17 (noting that their proposal for changes in NFL's
hiring process had the capability to promote "meaningful change").
'(6
07

See Collins, supra note 3, at 907-11 (discussing statistical effect of Rooney Rule).
Maravent, supra note 97, at 245.

108Collins, supra note 3, at 907.
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defensive strategist and then the Washington Redskins defensive coordinator,
interviewed for the position and became the Bengals' head coach."' In the year
after his hire, Lewis transformed the Bengals, who were for years one of the
NFL's worst teams, into a playoff contender, 112 a feat for which he narrowly
missed receiving the NFL's Coach of the Year Award. 113
Although Lewis has not yet guided his team to the Super Bowl, another
Rooney Rule beneficiary has. In 2004, the Chicago Bears hired Lovie Smith,
head coach.' 14
formerly the St. Louis Rams' defensive coordinator, as their new
Smith inherited a mediocre team, which had in the previous year gone 7-9.' '5 In
two seasons, however, Smith transformed the Bears' defense into, arguably, the
best in the NFL, and in January 2007, Smith led his team to a victory in the
National Football Conference championship game and to a consequent Super
Bowl berth.11 6 The 2007 Super Bowl would prove historic, as Smith would join
Tony Dungy, coach of the Indianapolis Colts, as the first African-American head
coaches in Super Bowl history. 17
By his own admission, without the opportunity the Rooney Rule produced,
Smith may not have ascended to the NFL's head coaching ranks. "8 Given an
equal opportunity, however, he did so ascend, and he proceeded to establish
himself among the NFL's head coaching elite.
CONCLUSION

Five years after the Rooney Rule's emergence, the Rule is an established
feature of NFL's teams' hiring processes. Indeed, although the NFL has stopped
short of requiring such interviews, it has strongly encouraged its member teams
to interview candidates of color for their highest-level front office positions. 19

12

Damon Hack, Bengals Draw Praise for Hiring of Lewis, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 2003, at D3.
See Jim Corbett, Lewis Confident in Untested Palmer, USA Today, May 29, 2004.
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114Bears Hire Smith to be Head Coach, USA Today, Jan. 14, 2004.
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17 Jarrett Bell, Coaches Chasing Super Bowl-And History, USA Today, Jan. 17, 2007.
118Clifton Brown, NFL Roundup: Bears Hope Takeaways Lead Them to Title, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30,
2007, at D2.
1"' Mark Maske, Expansion of 'Rooney Rule' Meets Resistance, Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 2006, at DI.
Indeed, the League's commitment to the Rooney Rule and its underlying principles is so complete that
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And, just as diversity has increased among the League's head coaches, it has
increased in the League's teams' front offices. 120
In short, the Rooney Rule has succeeded. No team has flouted the Rule
since Millen did so in 2003, it has increased diversity throughout the League, and
its beneficiaries have met with substantial success. As such, the Rule is enjoying
greater popularity than ever before-both among those affiliated with the NFL
and among outsiders committed to ensuring equal employment opportunity in
other contexts. Most notably, in October 2007, the NCAA's Division I Athletic
Directors' Association, concerned that minorities are disproportionately scarce
among the nation's Division I head football coaching positions, turned to a form
of the Rooney Rule in hopes of increasing equal employment opportunities
among minority head coaching candidates. 121 The organization's members have
committed to including candidates of color among the interviewees for their
universities' head football coaching vacancies. 122 Whether the athletic directors'
commitment will translate into greater diversity among Division I head coaches
is untold, but if the NFL's experience with the Rooney Rule is any indicator,
prospects are bright.
As Cyrus Mehri and Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. pressed the NFL to adopt the
Rooney Rule, they insisted they had "provided the basis for meaningful change"
and that it was the "obligation of the National Football League to see that change
happen[ed]."' 123 They were correct, and the League has, indeed, changed. Once
an embarrassment among its peer leagues regarding equal employment
opportunity for minority coaches, the NFL now stands as a model for other
organizations seeking the change it has enjoyed.

the League committed to interviewing candidates of color when seeking a replacement for former
League Commissioner Tagliabue.
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122Id.
123Cochran, Jr. & Mehri, supra note 2, at 17.

